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Abstract This study investigated whether the mere knowledge of the meaning of vari-
ables can facilitate inquiry learning processes and outcomes. Fifty-seven college freshmen
were randomly allocated to one of three inquiry tasks. The concrete task had familiar
variables from which hypotheses about their underlying relations could be inferred. The
intermediate task used familiar variables that did not invoke underlying relations, whereas
the abstract task contained unfamiliar variables that did not allow for inference of
hypotheses about relations. Results showed that concrete participants performed more
successfully and efficiently than intermediate participants, who in turn were equally suc-
cessful and efficient as abstract participants. From these findings it was concluded that
students learning by inquiry benefit little from knowledge of the meaning of variables per
se. Some additional understanding of the way these variables are interrelated seems
required to enhance inquiry learning processes and outcomes.
Keywords Inquiry learning  Prior knowledge  Induction  Deduction 
Computer simulations
Contemporary notions of learning emphasize that learners should be active agents of their
own learning processes (Bransford et al. 2002). These educational beliefs coincide with the
tenets of inquiry learning, a pedagogy in which learners infer knowledge about relation-
ships between variables in a domain by generating hypotheses and designing and executing
experiments to validate these hypotheses. Although inquiry learning is generally assumed
to lead to a deeper and more meaningful understanding, the effectiveness of this mode of
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learning is challenged by intrinsic problems many learners have with the complex, inte-
grated set of skills inquiry learning entails (De Jong and Van Joolingen 1998).
These difficulties might at least in part be attributable to the learners’ low levels of
domain knowledge. The basic principle of inquiry learning is for learners to infer
knowledge about a task or domain they are relatively unfamiliar with. Research in the area
of problem solving has shown that learners with little prior knowledge select less
sophisticated strategies and execute these strategies less effectively than learners with
higher levels of prior knowledge (e.g., Alexander and Judy 1988). Other studies have
shown that this conclusion generalizes to inquiry learning (Hmelo et al. 2000; Lavoie and
Good 1988; Schauble et al. 1991).
Offering domain information is an effective means to compensate for low levels of prior
knowledge. Leutner (1993) for instance found that presenting domain information prior to
the students’ inquiries is beneficial to learning. Presenting this information during the
inquiry session appeared to be even more effective. Hulshof and De Jong (2006) combined
domain support with experimentation hints. Students who received this support during
their inquiry achieved higher learning gains than students from the control condition who
had no access to this information. Low prior knowledge students in particular benefited
from the supportive content they could consult during task performance.
Despite these beneficial effects, offering domain information seems somewhat incom-
patible with the basic tenets of inquiry learning. In order to maintain the inquisitory nature
of the learning process, learners should be given just enough information to overcome
learning obstacles, thus enabling them to discover the largest possible part of a domain as
efficiently and effectively as possible. Researchers and practitioners should therefore try to
strike the right balance between offering and discovering domain information. Although
this choice will to some extent depend upon the characteristics of the learner and domain at
hand, a general understanding of how domain knowledge shapes the inquiry learning
process might certainly be helpful to differentiate the information that should be presented
from the information that should be left undisclosed.
Cognitive psychologists use the term content effects to refer to the influence of a
person’s familiarity with the information presented in the task on task performance.
Content effects have been investigated quite extensively in studies of inductive and
deductive reasoning. Proficient inquiry learners apply both methods of reasoning: they
induce hypotheses from prior knowledge or observed regularities in the domain, and
deduce the validity of these hypotheses from evidence gathered through experimentation
(Wilhelm and Beishuizen 2003). The results of studies on deductive and inductive rea-
soning could thus help shed more light on the domain characteristics that facilitate inquiry
learning processes and outcomes.
Content effects in deductive reasoning
Early studies on deductive reasoning focused on syllogisms: a kind of logical argument
that contains two premises that define a relationship between two categories (e.g., ‘‘All
cows are animals’’, and ‘‘All cows give milk’’) and a conclusion that can be inferred from
these premises (‘‘Therefore, some animals give milk’’). According to Henle’s (1962)
formal rule theory, premises are often open to different interpretations, which can lead to
reasoning errors. This was substantiated by Ceraso and Provitera (1971), who found that
people tend to misinterpret premises in abstract syllogisms and, as a result, accept illogical
conclusions. Revlis (1975) demonstrated that the use of meaningful content (as in the
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above example) can make premises less ambiguous and therefore less susceptible to
misinterpretation.
Content effects in deductive reasoning have also been widely studied on Wason’s
Selection Task (Wason 1966). The initial experiment clearly demonstrated the challenging
nature of this seemingly simple task: a mere 27 of the 128 participants managed to solve it
correctly (Johnson-Laird and Wason 1970). In a follow-up study, Wason and Shapiro
(1971) showed that task performance could be improved considerably if the original
abstract task content was replaced by a concrete content. A similar content effect was
found by Johnson-Laird et al. (1972) who used a version of the selection task in which
participants had to assume the role of postal workers checking the amount of postage on
different types of envelopes.
However, this content effect failed to show in a replication study with American par-
ticipants who were unfamiliar with the postal regulations underlying the task (Griggs and
Cox 1982). This could mean that in addition to concrete content, knowledge of the rules
that govern the relationships between variables is needed to facilitate deductive reasoning.
This was corroborated by Cheng and Holyoak (1985), who found that content effects on
the postal task can occur when participants are given a rationale for the rule. Cheng and
Holyoak (1985) also examined a version of the selection task in which the variables made
only a broad reference to domain-specific content (‘‘If one is to take action A, then one
must first satisfy precondition P’’). This task was solved significantly more often than the
abstract selection task (61 against 19% of the participants). This finding suggests that,
although the precise nature of action A and precaution P was unknown, participants’
knowledge of the causal relationship between actions and precautions in general might
have facilitated deductive reasoning.
Overall these studies lend support to the notion that domain knowledge can have a
facilitative effect on deductive reasoning. This effect comes about if the rule contains
concrete variables that are part of the learner’s prior knowledge so that the meaning of the
variables evokes the rationale for the rule. This evocation effect even occurs in case of
semi-concrete or partially familiar variables. Elucidating the rationale for the rule can be an
effective means to facilitate deductive reasoning in cases where the variables make little or
no reference to the learner’s prior knowledge.
Content effects in inductive reasoning
In inductive reasoning, a person seeks to infer a general rule from a set of specific instances.
Presenting the rationale for that rule is inappropriate to facilitate inductive reasoning, for
this would conflict with the nature of the reasoning task. Using meaningful content seems a
more suitable option, and has been the focus of inductive reasoning research.
Bruner et al. (1956) were among the first to investigate content effects in inductive
reasoning. One of their studies used a concrete and an abstract concept attainment task that
asked participants to discover a rule that described certain attributes of the concept. In
order to figure out the rule, participants could select a presumed instance of the concept and
ask the experimenter whether it satisfied the rule. The outcomes of this study indicated that
participants in the concrete condition selected more instances and stated more incorrect
hypotheses than participants in the abstract condition. From these findings Bruner et al.
(1956) concluded that participants in the concrete condition had relied upon the guidance
of common experience in attempting to attain the concept, which caused them to perform
less efficiently than participants from the abstract condition.
Domain knowledge and inquiry learning
123
Klahr and Dunbar (1988) reached a different conclusion. Participants in their study had
to discover how an unknown ‘‘repeat key’’ influenced the behavior of a computer-con-
trolled robot tank. Although all participants completed the task successfully, the way
participants arrived at their solution appeared to depend on their familiarity with the
domain. Participants with high prior knowledge required fewer trials to discover the rule
that determined the effect of the mystery button. They also performed fewer exploratory
trials that were not guided by a hypothesis than their less knowledgeable counterparts.
These results indicate that prior domain knowledge has a facilitative effect on performance
efficiency. Further analyses revealed that this effect arose because high prior knowledge
participants formulated stronger initial hypotheses and generated subsequent, alternative
hypotheses more easily.
Similar effects were reported by Wilhelm and Beishuizen (2003), who compared per-
formance across an inductive reasoning task with an everyday-life, concrete content and an
isomorphic, abstract task that involved variables and relations participants were incogni-
zant of. Performance success scores differed in favor of participants from the concrete
condition. Students who performed the concrete task also stated more experimentation
plans, proposed more hypotheses, and made more inferences than students from the
abstract condition. Concerning the difference in number of hypotheses, Wilhelm and
Beishuizen (2003) postulated that the everyday nature of the concrete task might have
invoked expectations about the relevance of independent variables and their effect on the
dependent variable. A related explanation is that familiar material provides explanatory
mechanisms participants in the concrete condition could use to readily interpret obtained
data and induce new hypotheses, thus reducing the number of exploratory trials needed to
generate a hypothesis.
Initial evidence for these explanations was acquired by Lazonder et al. (in press). Their
study involved a within-subject comparison of performance on a concrete and abstract task.
As expected, participants in this study attained higher performance success scores on the
concrete task. Their performance on the concrete task was also less exploratory in that they
conducted more experiments that aimed to test a hypothesis. A closer inspection of these
hypotheses indicated that all participants immediately started formulating and testing
hypotheses on the concrete task. On the abstract task, they generally performed four
exploratory trials before stating their first hypothesis.
To conclude, the use of concrete, familiar material can facilitate inductive reasoning.
When people know the meaning of the instances or variables in the reasoning task, they are
more efficient and successful in inducing the rule that governs the relationships between
the variables. This facilitative effect is due to the fact that concrete materials have the
power of evoking hypotheses about the to-be-discovered rule. Another, related reason is
that concrete materials provide explanatory mechanisms which facilitate the ease with
which new, alternative hypotheses can be inferred from obtained data.
Investigating content effects in inquiry learning
Inquiry learning revolves around discovering relationships between variables in an unfa-
miliar domain. Toward this end learners have to induce hypotheses from prior knowledge
or data obtained through exploration, and deduce the validity of these hypotheses through
systematic experimentation. At the outset of this paper it was assumed that generating and
testing hypotheses proceeds more efficiently if learners possess knowledge of the task or
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domain at hand. Reasoning research suggests that knowledge of the meaning of variables
can facilitate the discovery of rules that govern the relationships between these variables.
However, the conclusions from reasoning research do not necessarily generalize to
inquiry learning. The inductive reasoning studies in particular used materials from
everyday-life in which knowledge or expectations about the relationships was implied by
the meaning of the variables. In Wilhelm and Beishuizen (2003) for instance, participants
had to discover how common factors such as type of bicycle or weight of a schoolbag
influence the time it takes a teenage boy to cycle to school. As virtually everybody has at
least some sense of the general distinction between a city bike and a racing bike, people
will automatically assume the latter reduces the boy’s traveling time. Since inquiry
learning is essentially about discovering relations between variables in unfamiliar domains,
it is unclear whether the same inferential mechanism will apply. To illustrate, high school
students who know what current, potential difference, and resistance mean, may not readily
see how the former variable is determined by the latter two in electrical circuits containing
a conductor.
An experiment was performed to investigate whether knowledge of variables alone is
sufficient to facilitate inquiry learning in unfamiliar domains. The main purpose of this
experiment was to establish whether inquiry learning processes and outcomes are enhanced
in cases where the relation between variables is neither implied by nor inducable from the
meaning of the variables. Toward this end the experiment compared performance across
three isomorphic inquiry tasks. The concrete task involved a realistic problem and included
variables that had a familiar meaning to all participants. The relations between the vari-
ables could readily be inferred from the meaning of the variables. The intermediate task
also contained variables that are familiar from everyday life, but unfamiliar in relation to
the other variables in general and the dependent variable in particular. As a result, rela-
tionships could not be inferred from the meaning of the variables. The abstract task was
designed so that participants would neither know the meaning of the variables from
everyday life, not be able to infer expectations about the relations from the meaning of
variables.
Two sets of pairwise comparisons were made to establish whether knowledge of the
meaning of variables is a sufficient condition to facilitate inquiry learning. If so, partici-
pants in the intermediate condition would have to perform as efficiently and successfully as
participants in the concrete condition and more efficiently and successfully than partici-
pants in the abstract condition. If not, concrete participants would outperform intermediate
participants in terms of performance efficiency and performance success whereas the




Fifty-seven first-year students in social sciences volunteered to participate in the experi-
ment for course credits. There were 26 males and 31 females with a mean age of
19.61 years (SD = 1.79). Forty-three participants were Dutch; fourteen had the German
nationality. All German participants had sufficient command of the Dutch language to be
able to understand the verbal instructions and written materials. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to experimental conditions, leading to 19 participants per condition.
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Inquiry tasks
Three inquiry tasks were created in an authoring environment named FILE (Hulshof et al.
2005). The concrete task invited participants to investigate how each of four factors affects
an athlete’s 10,000 m time. These factors were training frequency (zero, one, or three times
per week), smoking (continue or quit), nutrition (sport food, regular food, or junk food),
and a substance called Xelam (yes or no). The baseline score was set at 45 min (zero
training sessions, continue smoking, regular food, no Xelam). Outcomes could range from
33 to 51 min depending on the factors’ values. Increasing training frequency reduced the
10k time by 1 min (one weekly session) or 3 min (three weekly sessions). Eating junk food
caused a 2-min increase, whereas eating sport food yielded a 2-min decrease in time.
Quitting smoking made the athlete to run 4 min faster. The effect of Xelam depended on
training frequency. It inhibited performance by 4 min if training frequency was zero, had
no effect in case of one weekly training session, and improved performance by 3 min if
there were three weekly training sessions.
Factors in the concrete task are generally well-known, and were thus expected to be
familiar to the college freshmen who participated in the experiment. Their knowledge of
the difference between factor values was further assumed to evoke expectations about the
factors’ general direction of effect on the 10k time. In case of nutrition for instance,
participants would infer from their knowledge of the difference between the three types of
food that sport food yields superior performance compared to junk food. Inspired by the
characteristics of the tasks of Klahr and Dunbar (1988) and Lazonder et al. (in press), the
factor Xelam was slightly ambiguous (different substances have different effects, not all of
which are beneficial to track running). This served to maintain the inquisitory nature of the
concrete task—participants might display atypical inquiry behavior or could not take the
task seriously if it merely contained known variables and inducable relationships. A pilot
test confirmed that college freshmen generally believe Xelam is some kind of drug that
improves performance during a 10k race, but need to scrutinize its effects in the simulation
to validate their presumption.
The intermediate task contained four familiar factors, namely musical instrument (drum,
guitar, or trumpet) cutlery (fork, spoon, or knife), flower (tulip or daffodil), and clothing
(trousers or shirt). Combinations of selected values for each factor yielded a number of points,
and participants had to discover how each factor influenced this score. Inference of relations
could not be determined by the meaning of the factors. It was therefore highly implausible (if
not impossible) that participants’ prior knowledge of the difference between a factor’s values
would evoke expectations about its influence on the numerical value. The task structure
defining the influence of the factors was made similar to that of the concrete task by substi-
tuting factors. Musical instrument replaced nutrition, cutlery took the place of training
frequency, flower supplanted smoking, and clothing substituted Xelam. Factor values were
transformed accordingly (e.g., continue smoking = tulip; quit smoking = daffodil).
The abstract task was designed to ensure that participants would have no prior
knowledge of the difference between the factor values, and could not infer expectations
about the relations from the factors’ meaning. This task asked participants to discover how
four geometrical shapes influenced a numerical score. Shapes included a triangle (blue or
brown), square (orange, purple, or green), circle (red, yellow, or pink), and question mark
(black or white). The underlying task structure was copied from the concrete task as
follows: training frequency was replaced by the circle, smoking became the triangle,
nutrition was substituted by the square, and Xelam by the question mark. The values of the
factors were adapted accordingly.
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The operation of the simulation was identical for all tasks. Participants could discover
the impact of a single factor by manipulating its values and observing the effect on the
output variable (either 10k time or number of points). Factor values could be set by
clicking the corresponding icon on the left side of the screen (see Fig. 1). Selected values
appeared in the experiment window on the right. Once all factors were set, participants had
to predict the outcome by selecting a value from the pull-down menu. They could then
click the Result button to run the experiment. In the experiment window, the actual
outcome appeared in boldface; the participants’ prediction appeared in roman. Participants
could scroll the experiment window to review previously conducted experiments; clicking
the magnifying glass button allowed them to inspect a self-selected set of experiments in a
separate window. All actions were recorded in a logfile.
Instruments
A background questionnaire determined participants’ demographic characteristics. A color
vision deficiency test was administered to ensure that participants in the abstract condition
were able to perceive differences between the colored shapes in their version of the task.
(As factor values in the concrete and intermediate task had other distinguishing features
besides color, normal color vision was not a requirement in these conditions.) The test
utilized seven items from the Ishihara color test (Ishihara 1982) that screened for red–green
deficiencies. Each item contained a circle of colored dots with a digit embedded in a
slightly different color that can be read by a person with normal color vision but not by
someone with defective color vision. Items were displayed on a 32-bit computer monitor
which, although presumably less accurate than the original printed plates, was deemed
Fig. 1 Simulation interface of the concrete task
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appropriate for screening purposes. The K-R 20 reliability estimate of the seven items was
.95.
A pretest was administered to check whether participants could make the correct
inferences about the factors’ general direction of effect. (The magnitude of these effects on
the performance of the athlete in this task had to be discovered during the experiment by
interacting with the simulation.) The ten items addressing training frequency, smoking, and
nutrition were ‘‘what-if’’ questions (Swaak and De Jong 1996). Each item comprised an
initial situation (e.g., ‘‘During an 8-week preparation for a 10k race, you have trained once
a week’’), a change (‘‘If you had trained three times per week…’’), and three post-change
situations that conveyed the possible direction of effects (‘‘… you would probably com-
plete the race [1] faster, [2] just as fast, [3] slower’’). Participants answered each item by
selecting one post-change situation. Two additional items assessed participants’ concep-
tions of Xelam and its effect on the 10k time. As the meaning of Xelam was slightly
ambiguous, and its effects on the 10k time depended on training frequency, the what-if
format with preset alternatives would reveal rather than assess the differentiated rela-
tionship participants should infer from the meaning of this factor. Hence two open
questions asked participants to write down what they thought Xelam was and how it might
affect an athlete’s 10,000 m performance.
Content validity of the what-if items was achieved by ensuring representative coverage
of the content of the concrete task as well as accurate representation of the variables and
relations within that task. Three what-if items addressed the effect of a factor in general
(e.g., ‘‘If you train more often, you will probably complete the race [1] faster, [2] just as
fast, [3] slower’’). The remaining seven what-if items involved a comparison between two
values of the same factor. Every possible combination of values was addressed once; a
sample item was given in the previous paragraph. All items dealt with the direction of
effects—the magnitude of effects was to be discovered during the experiment by inter-
acting with the simulation—and used the exact same context, factors, values and relations
as the concrete task. The internal consistency of the what-if items was satisfactory (K-R
20 = .61).
Procedure
Students participated in the experiment one at a time, receiving the same instructions and
following the same experimental procedures. All sessions took place in a quiet room
equipped with one computer. At the beginning of a session, participants completed the
pretest and the color vision deficiency test (the background questionnaire was administered
when they signed up for the experiment). These tests captured student characteristics
relevant to the concrete and abstract task, respectively, but were administered in all con-
ditions to rule out internal validity threats. Although the pretest could trigger inferences
about the relationships in the concrete task, this was not deemed undesirable since being
able to make these inferences was a requirement to participants in the concrete condition.
For the same reason, participants in the intermediate and abstract task (who should not be
able to make inferences prior to the task) received the same pretest and were not asked
about the variables and relations in their version of the task.
Following test administration the experimenter explained the experimental procedures
and demonstrated the operation of the simulation by means of a simple inquiry task
(determining the costs of a skiing holiday). Participants were then given either the con-
crete, intermediate, or abstract task, depending on the condition they were assigned to.
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After having read the task’s problem statement, they started experimenting with the
simulation to investigate the relationships between input variables and outcome variable.
Participants could consult an index card to see how each input variable was visually
represented in the simulation interface. They also received an answer form to take notes
during the activity and write down their final solution. The maximum time for task
completion was 40 min.
During task performance the experimenter asked participants about their hypotheses. A
hypothesis was defined as a statement of the factor under investigation and the presence,
direction, or magnitude of its effect on the output variable. While questioning has been
criticized for prompting participants to an underlying goal structure for systematic
experimentation (Klahr and Carver 1995), research has shown that non-directive probes
have no influence on participants’ inquiry learning processes (Wilhelm and Beishuizen
2004). Hence two non-directive questions were used to elicit the factor under investigation
(‘‘What are you going to investigate?’’), and its alleged effect on the output variable
(‘‘What do you think will be the outcome?’’). These questions were asked every time
participants could be testing a hypothesis. That is, questioning occurred whenever a par-
ticipant (1) had set-up a new experiment and clicked on ‘‘expected outcome’’, (2) scrolled
the experiment window to review previously conducted experiments, or (3) clicked the
magnifying glass button to compare self-selected sets of previously conducted experi-
ments. The experimenter wrote down the participant’s responses on a scoring sheet. The
reliability of this registration method was assessed by having two raters simultaneously
record the responses in five experimental sessions. Analysis of their scoring sheets dem-
onstrated satisfactory inter-rater agreement (90% agreement).
Coding and scoring
Participants’ responses to the seven items of the color vision deficiency test were scored as
true or false. Their responses to the pretest were checked against the model underlying the
concrete task. One point was allocated to each response that matched the relationship
between the variables in this model. Two open questions assessed participants’ conceptions
of Xelam. Their responses were coded according to the presumed direction of effect (i.e.,
positive effect, negative effect, no effect). To ensure that the what-if items were understood
correctly, a pilot test was performed with five individuals from the sample population. All
five participants achieved the maximum score of 10 points.
Main variables of the study were performance efficiency and performance success.
Performance efficiency was determined by time on task, the experiments participants
conducted, and the hypotheses they proposed. Time and experiments were assessed from
the logfiles. For the latter measure, a distinction was made between the number of unique
and duplicated experiments. Simulation runs testing a new, untried combination of factor
values were coded as unique experiment; if this combination reappeared in subsequent
trials it was considered a duplicated experiment. The maximum number of unique
experiments was 36 since there were this many distinct combinations of factor values in
each task. Each experiment was further classified according to the presence or absence of a
hypothesis (the definition of a hypothesis is given below). This categorization was used to
calculate the percentage of exploratory experiments as the ratio of the number of exper-
iments that were not guided by a hypothesis to the total number of experiments.
Participants’ hypotheses were scored from their responses to the probing questions. A
hierarchical rubric was used to classify the hypotheses according to their level of domain
specificity. A distinction was made between fully-specified, partially-specified, and
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unspecified hypotheses. A fully-specified hypothesis comprised two or more factor values
and a prediction of the direction and magnitude of the effect (‘‘I think the red circle yields a
two-point higher score than the yellow circle’’). Partially-specified hypotheses predicted
the direction of effect of two or more factor values (‘‘I think the red circle yields a higher
score than the yellow circle’’). Unspecified hypotheses merely denoted the existence of an
effect (‘‘I think the circle affects the score’’). Statements of experimentation plans (‘‘I am
going to investigate the circle’’) or ignorance (‘‘I have no idea’’) were not considered
hypotheses. Two raters coded the hypotheses of eight randomly selected scoring sheets of
each task. Inter-rater agreement scores (Cohen’s j) were .97 for the concrete task, .96 for
the intermediate task, and .97 for the abstract task.
Performance success was assessed from the answer forms. A hierarchical rubric was
used to transform these data into a performance success score. Up to 3 points could be
earned for each factor, leading to a maximum score of 12 points. Three points were
awarded for a factor if both the magnitude and direction of the effect were correct for each
value of that factor. Two points were given if the direction of the effect was correct but its
magnitude was (partly) incorrect or incomplete. One point was awarded if the answer
expressed that a factor affected the output variable, but neither the magnitude nor the
direction of this effect was specified correctly. In all cases, ‘‘correct’’ was judged from the
simulation’s underlying model. Two raters used this rubric to score a randomly selected set
of eight answer forms of each task. Inter-rater reliability estimates (Cohen’s j) reached .86
for the concrete task, .92 for the intermediate task, and 1.00 for the abstract task.
Results
The color vision deficiency test checked whether participants in the abstract condition were
able to visually discriminate factor values. One male participant from the abstract condi-
tion answered one item incorrectly; all other participants achieved a perfect score. These
scores gave no reason to assume that participants in the abstract condition had difficulties
distinguishing factor values. Pretest scores indicated whether participants in the concrete
condition could infer the nature of the relationships between the variables in the simula-
tion. Participants in the concrete condition produced a mean pretest score of 9.16
(SD = 1.12). However, one participant achieved a pretest score of 6. As this score was
more than two standard deviations below the sample mean, this participant was excluded
from the sample. The remaining participants’ conception of Xelam was quite consistent: 17
participants thought it would generally improve the athlete’s performance; two participants
thought Xelam would have no effect.
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for performance efficiency. Data for time
on task indicate that participants generally needed less than the given 40 min to complete
their task. Univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that task type had no effect
on this measure (F(2,53) = 1.93, MSE = 123.19, p = .16), indicating that participants in
the three conditions needed as much time to complete their version of the task.
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) yielded no significant effect of task type
on the number of unique and duplicated experiments (F(4,106) = 1.25, p = .29). There
was, however, a significant difference in exploratory experiments (F(2,53) = 11.28,
MSE = 549.14, p \ .01). Planned contrasts revealed that participants in the concrete
condition had a significantly lower percentage of exploratory experiments than participants
from the intermediate condition (t(53) = 4.45, p \ .01, r = .52). The difference in
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percentage of exploratory experiments between the intermediate and abstract condition
was not significant (t(53) = .75, p = .46).
A MANOVA on the participants’ hypotheses produced a significant effect of task type
(F(4,104) = 4.40, p \ .01). Subsequent univariate ANOVAs showed that task type had no
effect on the percentage unspecified hypotheses (F(2,52) = 1.49, MSE = 228.95,
p = .24), but did affect the percentage of partially-specified and fully-specified hypotheses
(F(2,52) = 9.44, MSE = 9670.28, p \ .01; respectively F(2,52) = 8.05, MSE = 7541.14,
p \ .01). Planned contrasts revealed that participants in the concrete and intermediate
condition had comparable percentages of partially-specified hypotheses (t(52) = 1.85,
p = .07), whereas intermediate participants had a lower percentage of partially-specified
hypotheses than participants in the abstract condition (t(52) = 2.45, p \ .05, r = .32). For
fully-specified hypotheses this pattern in scores was reversed, with a lower percentage of
hypotheses in the concrete condition compared to the intermediate condition (t(52) = 2.08,
p \ .05, r = .28), and a nonsignificant difference among the intermediate and abstract
condition (t(52) = 1.90, p = .06).
A performance success score reflected the extent to which participants’ knowledge of
the relations between the variables matched the simulations’ underlying model. An
ANOVA produced a significant effect of task type on this measure (F(2,53) = 3.25,
MSE = 7.54, p \ .05). Planned contrasts showed that this effect arose because participants
in the concrete condition (M = 9.56, SD = 2.38) achieved significantly higher perfor-
mance success scores than participants in the intermediate condition (M = 7.37,
SD = 3.08; t(53) = 2.42, p \ .05, r = .32). Scores in the intermediate condition were
lower than those in the abstract condition (M = 9.05, SD = 2.72), but this difference was
not statistically significant (t(53) = 1.89, p = .06).
Multiple regression analysis was performed to explain observed differences in perfor-
mance success from the measures that defined performance efficiency. Using the Enter
method, a significant model emerged (F(7,48) = 4.10, MSE = 5.85, p \ .01) that
accounted for 28.3% of the variance in performance success. As the unstandardized
regression coefficients in Table 2 indicate, performance success was negatively related to
Table 1 Means and standard deviations for performance efficiency by type of task
Type of task
Concrete (n = 18) Intermediate (n = 19) Abstract (n = 19)
Time on task
Time (min) 28.76 (11.62) 25.50 (12.31) 32.56 (9.14)
Experiments
Unique experiments (#)a 15.56 (5.92) 14.16 (6.21) 18.16 (5.53)
Duplicated experiments (#) 5.56 (8.76) 5.0 (5.61) 5.95 (5.68)
Exploratory experiments (%) 12.27 (5.52) 46.58 (5.38) 40.86 (5.38)
Hypothesesb
Unspecified hypotheses (%) 5.68 (6.86) 4.15 (8.94) 10.84 (18.02)
Partially-specified hypotheses (%) 80.07 (16.23) 60.36 (37.70) 34.52 (36.97)
Fully-specified hypotheses (%) 14.25 (16.99) 35.50 (38.13) 54.64 (32.58)
a Maximum = 36
b Scores for the three types of hypotheses within each condition add up to 100%. One intermediate
participant generated no hypotheses and was removed from the analyses
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the percentage of exploratory experiments. With all other variables held constant, a 10%
decrease in exploratory experiments would increase the performance success score by
nearly half a point. Performance success was positively associated with the participants’
hypotheses, meaning that a 10% increase in unspecified hypotheses would raise perfor-
mance success scores by .78. For partially specified and fully specified hypotheses, these
values were .55 and .73, respectively. The other variables listed in Table 2 did not make a
significant contribution to the regression model.
Together these findings suggest that the mere testing of hypotheses, regardless of their
level of domain specificity, was the strongest predictor of performance success. Stepwise
multiple regression analysis bore this out. Using the significant predictor variables above,
exploratory experiments was the only parameter in the model that had a significant impact
on performance success scores (Adjusted R2 = .223, b = -.487, p \ .001).
Discussion
This study sought to uncover why domain knowledge facilitates inquiry learning processes
and outcomes. Reasoning research has shown that knowledge of the meaning of variables
is sufficient to facilitate the discovery of rules that govern the relationships between these
variables. If this conclusion generalizes to inquiry learning, participants in the concrete and
intermediate condition would perform equally efficient and successful. If not, performance
efficiency and performance success would be comparable across the intermediate and
abstract condition.
Results for performance efficiency show that participants in the intermediate and
concrete condition needed as much time to complete their task and performed as many
experiments. In the concrete condition however, these experiments were more often used
to test a hypothesis, as evidenced by the lower percentage of exploratory experiments. This
suggests that the concrete task enables participants to infer hypotheses from the meaning of
the variables; additional evidence for this claim comes from the pretest scores. Multiple
regression analysis further showed that the presence of hypotheses per se is a plausible
explanation for the fact that participants in the concrete condition achieved higher per-
formance success scores than participants from the intermediate condition.
In view of these findings one might expect comparable outcomes for participants in the
intermediate and abstract condition. Performance efficiency measures support this
Table 2 Summary of regression analysis for variables predicting performance success
Predictor variable B SE b
Time on task -.032 .048 -.125
Unique experiments -.038 .102 -.080
Duplicated experiments .081 .060 .190
Exploratory experiments -.047 .014 -.450**
Unspecified hypotheses .078 .036 .339*
Partially-specified hypotheses .055 .027 .710*
Fully-specified hypotheses .073 .026 .876**
Note: Adjusted R2 = .283 (N = 56, p \ .01)
* p \ .05
** p \ .01
A. W. Lazonder et al.
123
expectation: participants in the aforementioned conditions completed their task equally
fast, conducted as many experiments, and displayed a similar percentage of exploratory
experiments. Performance success was also comparable in these conditions. Although
intermediate participants admittedly tended to perform less successful than their abstract
counterparts, this difference was not statistically significant. From these pairwise com-
parisons it can be concluded that students learning by inquiry have little to no advantage of
knowledge of the meaning of variables. Some additional understanding of the way these
variables are interrelated, or the possibility to infer these relations, seems required to
facilitate inquiry learning processes and outcomes.
Still, the intermediate and abstract condition differed with regard to the specificity of the
participants’ hypotheses. Lazonder et al. (in press) showed that this measure is indicative
of participants’ approach to the task. On the concrete task, inferential mechanisms enable
participants to infer hypotheses about the direction of effects (‘‘the more you practice, the
faster you will run’’). Testing this partially-specified hypothesis produces outcomes (e.g., a
4-min difference in time) that can readily be interpreted on the basis of prior knowledge,
thus reducing the need to validate observed outcomes by generating and testing a fully-
specified hypothesis. Participants in the abstract condition—in absense of prior knowledge
and inferential mechanisms—start off in a data-driven mode. They perform exploratory
experiments to get some sense of the relations between dependent and independent vari-
ables (‘‘maybe the blue triangle yields a two-point higher score than the brown triangle’’)
and then generate and test fully-specified hypotheses to assess whether newly induced
knowledge is correct.
As hypotheses on the intermediate task hold the middle ranks on specificity, participants
in this condition may have combined both approaches by performing exploratory experi-
ments to generate and test fully-specified hypotheses and inferring partially-specified
hypotheses from prior knowledge and experimental outcomes. The first part of this sup-
position is substantiated by the high percentage of exploratory experiments in this
condition; support for the second part comes from anecdotal evidence gathered by the
experimenters. They noticed that initial outcomes often evoked a rationale for the rule
governing the relationship between variables. Many participants thought the numerical
score represented money or weight, and used this idea to formulate and test partially-
specified hypotheses for the other variables. Since this rationale could not be confirmed
(relationships were arbitrary), participants may have developed confusion or misconcep-
tions that caused them to perform less successfully than participants in the other conditions.
Unfortunately there was no systematic observation of this usage of inferential mechanisms,
but it would certainly be interesting to address this issue in future research.
These unexpected inferences nevertheless strengthen the conclusion that a basic
understanding of relations between variables is required to enhance inquiry learning pro-
cesses and outcomes. On the one hand this knowledge can bootstrap students’ inquiry
practices in cases where relations in a domain cannot be inferred from the meaning of
variables. On the other hand this knowledge can safeguard students from the adverse
consequences of their quest for meaning. The experimenters’ observations suggest that
learners have a strong natural tendency to induce a rationale from discovered relations
which in turn evokes hypotheses about undiscovered relations. As these inferences are
easily prone to error (especially for domain novices), offering some information on the
relations in a domain could warrant the efficiency and success of inquiry learning within
that domain.
Still, some people might question the generalizability of this study’s findings to inquiry
learning in schools. Asking students to explore unknown relationships between known or
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even unknown variables is admittedly an uncommon educational practice. This study was
certainly not designed to advocate the use of such tasks (and neither do its results), but
instead served to further improve our understanding of effective scientific inquiry learning
in schools. On the other hand, it is not inconceivable that science educators who adopt an
inquiry-based pedagogy put at least some of their students in a position comparable to that
of participants in the intermediate or abstract condition. Students who have difficulty
understanding the material, or did not prepare themselves for class may perceive a com-
puter simulation of a familiar phenomenon as one in which the variables and/or their
relations unknown. How these students can be supported on a just-in-time basis is an
important question for future research.
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